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ABSTRACT	
When	 confronting	 democratic	 backsliding	 in	 its	 member	 states,	 the	 European	 Union	 (EU)	 cannot	 rely	 on	
material	 sanctions.	 There	 are	 formidable	 obstacles	 to	 using	 the	 one	 political	 safeguard	 that	 entails	material	
sanctions,	namely	Article	7	of	the	Treaty	on	European	Union	(TEU).	Moreover,	the	experience	of	the	EU’s	pre-
accession	conditionality	suggests	 that	even	a	credible	 threat	of	material	 sanctions	 is	 least	effective	 the	more	
severe	 the	 breaches	 of	 liberal	 democracy.	 However,	 EU	 interventions	 without	 material	 leverage	 are	 not	
necessarily	doomed,	as	the	case	of	Romania	in	2012	shows.	Under	favourable	conditions	the	EU	can	thus	elicit	
governments	 to	 repeal	 illiberal	 practices	 by	 relying	 primarily	 on	 social	 pressure	 and	 persuasion.	 This	
contribution	 assesses	 to	 what	 extent	 novel	 instruments	 that	 EU	 institutions	 have	 developed	 to	 confront	
democratic	backsliding	meet	 the	 requirements	 for	effective	 social	 influence.	 It	 argues	 that	 the	Commission’s	
Rule	of	Law	Framework	has	potential	because	it	meets	the	criteria	of	formalisation,	publicity,	and	impartiality.	
Yet	to	increase	the	likelihood	of	influence,	it	needs	to	be	applied	more	consistently	and	should	be	embedded	in	
a	process	of	regular	monitoring	through	a	democracy	scoreboard	covering	all	member	states.	
	
KEYWORDS	 democratic	 backsliding,	 European	 Union,	 Hungary,	 Poland,	 rule	 of	 law,	
sanctions,	social	pressure.	
	
INTRODUCTION	
The	 increase	 of	 illiberal	 practices	 in	 member	 states	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 (EU)	 –	 most	
notably	by	the	Fidesz	government	in	Hungary	since	2010	and	the	Law	and	Justice	Party	(PiS)	
government	in	Poland	after	December	2015	–	has	led	to	numerous	calls	to	reform	the	EU’s	
instruments	against	such	‘democratic	backsliding’.	Yet	a	judicialisation	of	the	EU’s	safeguards	
(Blauberger	and	Kelemen	2016)	 is	unlikely	as	 the	EU	member	 states	are	unwilling	 to	 cede	
any	 control	 over	 how	 to	 respond	 to	 such	 cases	 to	 autonomous	 institutional	 bodies.	 EU	
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institutions	will	 therefore	have	 to	make	do	with	 the	EU’s	 current	political	 safeguards.	This	
contribution	 distinguishes	 such	 political	 safeguards	 according	 to	 two	 main	 mechanisms	
through	 which	 they	 seek	 to	 influence	 the	 behaviour	 of	 target	 governments:	 material	
sanctions	and	social	 influence	 (Sedelmeier	2014:	113-14).	 It	argues	 that	material	 sanctions	
are	 difficult	 to	 use,	 due	 to	 a	 combination	 of	 voting	 rules,	member	 state	 preferences	 and	
party	 politics.	 Yet	 even	 if	 it	were	possible	 to	 facilitating	 the	use	of	material	 sanctions,	we	
should	not	overstate	the	scope	for	reining	in	backsliding	through	material	sanctions:	they	are	
least	likely	to	deter	governments	the	more	these	rely	on	illiberal	practices	to	maintain	office.	
	 EU	institutions	will	therefore	need	to	resort	primarily	to	instruments	based	on	social	
pressure	to	confront	breaches	of	 liberal	democratic	principles	in	the	member	states.	These	
instruments	include	more	recent	institutional	innovations,	such	as	the	Commission’s	Rule	of	
Law	Framework,	its	Justice	Scoreboard,	and	the	Council’s	dialogue	to	promote	and	safeguard	
the	rule	of	law.	Despite	scepticism	about	these	new	monitoring	and	dialogue	procedures	at	
the	EU	level	for	lacking	teeth,	they	are	not	inevitably	powerless	when	faced	with	democratic	
backsliding.	 The	 case	 of	 the	 acquiescence	 of	 the	 Ponta	 government	 in	 Romania	 in	 2012	
demonstrates	that	under	–	admittedly	demanding	–	conditions,	EU	influence	is	possible	even	
without	material	sanctions.	Social	pressure	through	the	EU’s	existing	 instruments	might	be	
able	 to	achieve	 the	desired	results	of	domestic	change,	especially	 if	 they	are	adjusted	and	
applied	 in	such	a	way	as	 to	maximise	 their	 legitimacy.	Especially	 the	Commission’s	Rule	of	
Law	Framework	has	potential	because	 it	meets	 the	criteria	of	 formalisation,	publicity,	 and	
impartiality.	 Yet	 to	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 of	 influence,	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 applied	 more	
consistently	 and	 should	 be	 embedded	 in	 a	 process	 of	 regular	 monitoring	 through	 a	
democracy	scoreboard	covering	all	member	states.	
The	 next	 section	 discusses	 the	 EU’s	 main	 instrument	 through	 which	 it	 can	 wield	
material	 sanctions.	 It	 first	 analyses	 the	 obstacles	 for	 using	 this	 specific	 instrument,	 and	
second,	drawing	on	 the	 literature	on	EU	accession	conditionality,	 it	points	out	 the	general	
limits	of	reining	in	backsliding	through	material	sanctions.	The	subsequent	section	assesses	
the	 scope	 of	 novel	 EU	 instruments	 to	 address	 democratic	 backsliding	 through	 social	
influence.	It	draws	on	the	literature	on	international	socialisation	and	on	the	EU’s	previous	
experience	of	using	social	pressure	to	identify	conditions	under	which	these	instruments	can	
be	 used	 effectively	 and	 how	 these	 instruments	 and	 their	 application	 can	 be	 adjusted	 to	
increase	the	likelihood	of	successful	social	influence.	
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THE	LIMITS	OF	MATERIAL	SANCTIONS	AGAINST	DEMOCRATIC	BACKSLIDING	
Article	7	TEU	is	the	EU’s	main	instrument	against	domestic	breaches	of	liberal	democracy.	It	
allows	 the	 European	 Council	 to	 suspend	 ‘certain	 [membership]	 rights’	 of	 a	member	 state	
that	commits	a	‘serious	and	persistent	breach’	of	the	liberal	democratic	values	contained	in	
Article	 2	 TEU.	 Article	 7	 explicitly	 mentions	 that	 these	 rights	 include	 voting	 rights	 in	 the	
Council,	 but	 clearly	 other,	 and	 potentially	 even	 stronger	 (or	 weaker)	 sanctions	 (such	 as	
withholding	 funding	 from	 the	 EU	 budget)	 are	 possible.	 In	 principle,	 the	 EU	 therefore	 has	
significant	 sanctioning	 power,	 but	 Article	 7	 specifically,	 and	 material	 sanctions	 more	
generally,	 have	 limits	 as	 an	 instrument	 to	 rein	 in	 breaches	 of	 liberal	 democracy	 in	 the	
member	 states.	 First,	 a	 combination	of	 voting	 rules,	member	 state	preferences,	 and	party	
politics	make	it	difficult	to	use	Article	7.	Second,	even	if	it	was	easier	to	use	it,	insights	from	
the	 literature	 on	 the	 EU’s	 accession	 conditionality	 suggest	 that	 there	 are	 limits	 to	 the	
domestic	changes	that	 the	EU	can	achieve	through	material	sanctions	when	facing	 illiberal	
governments.		
Political	obstacles	to	the	use	of	Article	7	TEU	
There	are	formidable	political	obstacles	to	using	Article	7	to	defend	liberal	democracy	in	the	
member	states.	It	has	never	been	used	since	its	insertion	into	the	TEU	through	the	Treaty	of	
Amsterdam	 in	 1997.	 Although	 the	 (then)	member	 states	 agreed	 on	 sanctions	 against	 the	
Austrian	 government	 after	 the	 Austrian	 People’s	 Party	 (ÖVP)	 formed	 a	 coalition	with	 the	
radical	 right	 Freedom	 Party	 (FPÖ)	 in	 2000,	 these	 sanctions	 were	 not	 based	 on	 Article	 7.	
Instead	they	were	–	albeit	collectively	agreed	–	bilateral	diplomatic	sanctions	(see	Merlingen	
et	al.	2001;	Schlipphak	and	Treib	2016).	Not	only	has	Article	7	never	been	used;	so	far	there	
has	not	even	been	a	formal	proposal	to	use	it	by	either	the	Commission	or	the	one	third	of	
the	member	states	required	by	Article	7(2),	let	alone	a	vote	on	such	a	proposal	in	the	EP	or	
the	 European	 Council.	 The	 obstacles	 to	 using	 Article	 7,	 and	 thus	 to	 threaten	 material	
sanctions	credibly,	result	from	a	combination	of	voting	rules,	member	state	preferences,	and	
party	politics.		
Article	 7	 requires	 very	 demanding	 majorities	 in	 EU	 institutions	 for	 the	 use	 of	
sanctions.	It	makes	a	distinction	between	establishing	the	existence	of	a	breach	of	the	EU’s	
liberal	democratic	principles	on	the	one	hand,	and	deciding	whether	and	how	to	sanction	a	
breach	on	the	other.	Strictly	speaking,	Article	7	does	then	not	actually	make	it	very	difficult	
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to	use	sanctions	 if	a	breach	of	Article	2	has	been	established:	the	member	states	can	pass	
such	a	decision	with	a	qualified	majority.	What	makes	it	so	difficult	to	use	Article	7	is	that	the	
very	establishment	of	a	breach	is	also	within	the	purview	of	the	member	states.	And	it	is	this	
decision,	 rather	 than	 the	 subsequent	 decision	 about	 sanctions,	 that	 requires	 extremely	
demanding	 majorities:	 unanimity	 (minus	 one)	 in	 the	 European	 Council	 and	 a	 two-thirds	
majority	in	the	EP.	These	high	voting	thresholds	also	appear	to	deter	even	mere	proposals	to	
use	Article	7:	potential	supporters	are	reluctant	to	submit	a	formal	proposal	for	fear	that	a	
defeat	 will	 be	 interpreted	 as	 establishing	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 breach,	 rather	 than	 simply	 a	
shortfall	of	the	required	political	support.	For	example,	in	October	2015	the	centre-left	S&D	
group	 in	 the	European	Parliament	 (EP)	declined	to	support	an	attempt	by	the	 liberal	ALDE	
group	to	initiate	a	vote	on	Article	7	against	Hungary,	despite	agreeing	in	principle.	But	since	
the	supporters	did	not	have	the	required	majority,	they	feared	that	‘Orban	will	laugh	at	this’	
(EUobserver	07.10.2015).	
Member	 state	 preferences	 are	 another	 obstacle	 to	 using	 Article	 7.	 Both	 these	
demanding	 voting	 rules	 and	 the	 general	 determination	 of	 the	 member	 states	 in	 the	
negotiations	 of	 the	 Amsterdam	 Treaty	 to	 maintain	 full	 control	 over	 the	 use	 of	 Article	 7	
reflect	 a	 strong	underlying	 aversion	 to	 using	 sanctions.	 These	unfavourable	member	 state	
preferences	stem	partly	from	concerns	about	national	sovereignty,	especially	among	the	less	
integration-minded	governments.	Partly	they	reflect	more	general	concerns	about	isolating	
individual	 member	 states,	 and	 that	 alienating	 a	 government	 through	 applying	 sanctions	
would	 be	 detrimental	 to	 cooperative	 decision-making	 in	 the	 EU.	 Apart	 from	 a	 general	
disinclination	 of	most	member	 governments,	 the	 unanimity	 (minus	 one)	 requirement	 has	
become	virtually	insurmountable	now	that	the	European	Council	includes	not	only	one,	but	
two,	illiberal	governments	–	Fidesz	in	Hungary	and	PiS	in	Poland	–	that	are	potential	targets	
of	Article	7.	And	indeed,	Hungarian	Prime	Minister	Viktor	Orbán	was	quick	to	announce	that	
‘Hungary	 will	 never	 support	 any	 sort	 of	 sanctions	 against	 Poland’	 (Financial	 Times,	
08.01.2016).		
	 A	further	obstacle	to	using	Article	7	 is	party	politics.	Commentators	have	suggested	
that	a	key	reason	why	the	EU	has	not	sanctioned	Hungary	is	the	opposition	of	the	European	
People’s	Party	(EPP),	the	political	group	in	the	EP	to	which	Fidesz	belongs	(see	e.g.	Kelemen	
2015).	A	more	systematic	analysis	of	the	positions	of	the	EP’s	political	groups	confirms	that	
there	is	 indeed	a	partisan	dimension	to	support	and	opposition	for	using	Article	7,	but	 it	 is	
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not	simply	a	function	of	parties’	ideological	distance	from	the	target	government	(in	terms	of	
the	Left/Right	orientation	of	the	government	parties).	The	partisan	orientations	that	shape	
party	groups’	attitudes	towards	sanctions	 include	additional	dimensions,	namely	a	political	
group’s	attitude	towards	European	integration	and	their	commitment	to	 liberal	democracy	
(Sedelmeier	 2014:	 108-113;	 Sedelmeier	 2016).	 Of	 course	 the	 findings	 about	 EP	 group	
positions	 do	 not	 necessarily	 apply	 to	 the	 member	 state	 governments	 in	 the	 Council.	
Nonetheless,	the	requirement	of	the	EP’s	assent	in	Article	7(2)	TEU	means	that	party	politics	
–	 even	 if	 confined	 to	 the	 EP	 –	 present	 a	 formidable	 obstacle	 to	 using	 this	 tool	 to	 redress	
democratic	backsliding	in	member	states.	Moreover,	if	party	politics	constrain	the	ability	of	
the	EP	to	expose	and	condemn	democratic	backsliding	in	member	states,	it	silences	precisely	
the	EU	institution	that	is	usually	the	most	vocal	advocate	of	liberal	democracy	in	the	EU.		
At	 the	 same	 time,	 these	 partisan	 dynamics	 also	 suggest	 that	 certain	 constellations	
with	 regard	 to	 the	 party-political	 composition	 of	 the	 target	 government	 might	 be	 more	
conducive	to	using	Article	7	than	others.	First,	illiberal	measures	by	governments	of	the	Left	
are	more	likely	to	be	met	with	widespread	opposition	in	the	EP.	Parties	of	the	centre-right	–	
that	tend	to	score	lower	with	regard	to	support	for	liberal	democracy	–	are	likely	to	support	
sanctions	against	their	ideological	rivals.	And	since	centre-left	parties	tend	to	have	a	stronger	
commitment	to	liberal	democracy,	they	are	also	more	likely	to	be	prepared	to	use	sanctions	
against	governments	to	which	they	are	close	on	a	Left/Right	dimension.	Indeed,	this	was	the	
case	 for	 the	 Greens	 and	 Social	 Democrats	 with	 regard	 to	 Victor	 Ponta’s	 centre-left	
government	 in	Romania	 in	2012	(on	which	 I	will	elaborate	 further	below).	Second,	 illiberal	
governments	 composed	 of	 national	 conservative	 parties	 or	 populist	 radical	 right	 parties	
might	 face	 support	 for	 sanctions	 not	 only	 from	 the	 centre-left,	 but	 also	 from	 the	 centre-
right.	Even	if	such	governments	are	not	equally	ideologically	(Left/Right)	distant	as	parties	of	
the	Left,	parties	 in	 the	EPP	might	 consider	 them	 ideological	 rivals,	 if	 they	are	members	of	
other	 political	 groups:	 PiS	 in	 Poland	 is	 a	 member	 of	 the	 European	 Conservatives	 and	
Reformists	 (ECR)	 group,	while	 its	main	 domestic	 rival,	 the	 centre-right	 Civic	 Platform,	 is	 a	
member	of	the	EPP.	And	indeed,	the	EPP	supported	the	EP	resolution	of	13	April	2016	that	
expressed	its	concerns	about	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law	in	Poland.		
Yet	 these	 caveats	 notwithstanding,	 the	 key	 point	 remains	 that	 party	 politics,	 in	
addition	to	more	traditional	concerns	about	national	sovereignty	in	the	member	states,	and	
to	 the	very	demanding	majority	 requirements	 in	 the	EP	and	 the	European	Council,	 greatly	
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reduce	 the	 possibility	 to	 use	 the	 sanctions	 of	 Article	 7	 against	 democratic	 backsliding	 in	
member	states.	
The	limits	of	influence	through	material	sanctions	
In	addition	to	the	political	obstacles	for	EU	institutions	to	the	use	of	material	sanctions,	their	
actual	capacity	to	redress	democratic	backsliding	is	severely	limited.	Even	credible	threats	of	
material	 sanctions	 are	 no	 panacea	 against	 illiberal	 practices	 in	 member	 states.	 The	
effectiveness	of	material	sanctions	decreases	the	more	serious	such	cases	are.	
Although	the	EU	has	never	used	sanctions	internally,	there	is	a	body	of	literature	that	
can	provide	clues	about	the	conditions	under	which	material	sanctions	are	effective.	Studies	
of	EU	conditionality	towards	candidate	countries	suggest	that	the	EU’s	material	incentives	–	
the	prospect	of	EU	membership,	and	conversely,	the	threat	of	withholding	membership	and	
its	associated	benefits	–	can	be	highly	effective	 in	bringing	about	domestic	changes	(Kelley	
2004;	 Schimmelfennig	 and	 Sedelmeier	 2004;	 Sedelmeier	 2011;	 Vachudova	 2005).	 Yet	 this	
literature	also	suggests	that	material	 incentives	are	insufficient	when	used	towards	illiberal	
governments	 (Schimmelfennig	 and	 Sedelmeier	 2005b:	 213-14;	 Schimmelfennig	 2005).	 In	
cases	 like	 Slovakia	 under	 Vladimír	Mečiar	 or	 Croatia	 under	 Franjo	 Tuđman,	 EU	 incentives	
were	 unable	 to	 bring	 about	 democratic	 domestic	 changes.	 These	 governments	 precisely	
relied	on	illiberal	practices	in	order	to	maintain	power	and	renouncing	such	practices	would	
have	threatened	to	undermine	their	ability	to	retain	office.	Even	when	faced	with	the	threat	
of	remaining	outside	the	EU,	illiberal	 leaders	chose	to	maintain	undemocratic	practices.	EU	
conditionality	might	have	helped	to	lock	in	democratic	change	in	fragile	democracies	when	
voter	dissatisfaction	led	to	the	defeat	of	illiberal	parties	in	‘watershed	elections’	(Vachudova	
2005,	Schimmelfennig	and	Sedelmeier	2005b).	But	EU	 interventions	did	not	determine	the	
outcome	of	such	elections.	At	best,	the	EU	played	an	indirect	role	through	providing	a	focal	
point	for	opposition	parties	to	unite	and	to	moderate	their	platforms	(Vachudova	2005).		
These	 findings	 of	 the	 literature	 on	 pre-accession	 conditionality	 imply	 that	 the	
capacity	 of	 material	 sanctions	 to	 reverse	 democratic	 backsliding	 is	 limited.	 If	 illiberal	
governments	 are	prepared	 to	 forego	 the	possibility	of	 joining	 the	EU,	would	 the	 threat	of	
expulsion	from	the	EU	or	withholding	EU	funds	(let	alone	weaker	material	sanctions)	make	
them	change	the	practices	that	keep	them	in	power?	Of	course	such	choices	depend	on	the	
nature	of	their	illiberal	practices	and	to	what	extent	they	are	critical	for	maintaining	office.	
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Voters	might	also	be	more	likely	to	punish	governments	in	a	post-accession	scenario	if	they	
lose	actual	benefits	of	membership	rather	than	in	a	pre-accession	scenario	when	they	had	to	
forego	prospective	gains	from	membership.		
Yet	 even	widespread	 voter	 dissatisfaction	 about	 losing	membership	 benefits	might	
not	 endanger	 a	 government’s	 grip	 on	office.	 Illiberal	 practices	 precisely	make	 it	 easier	 for	
governments	to	withstand	a	possible	backlash	from	voters.	Moreover,	sanctions	that	impose	
material	costs	on	the	country	by	withdrawing	the	benefits	of	membership	might	not	simply	
mobilise	 societal	 groups	 that	 lose	 out	 against	 the	 government.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 as	 also	
suggested	 by	 Schlipphak	 and	 Treib	 (2016),	 governments	 can	 use	 outside	 interventions	
through	 EU	 sanctions	 to	mobilise	 domestic	 support.	 External	 threats	 can	 have	 a	 ‘rallying-
round-the-flag	effect’	as	domestic	groups	back	the	government	in	order	to	avoid	appearing	
disloyal	 (Galtung	 1967).	 Moreover,	 governments	 can	 blame	 external	 sanctions	 for	 any	
hardship	that	voters	experience	and	avoid	scrutiny	for	failings	of	their	own	socio-economic	
policies.		
In	 sum,	 we	 should	 not	 place	 exaggerated	 hopes	 into	 the	 capacity	 of	 material	
sanctions	to	reverse	backsliding.	They	will	be	 least	effective	the	more	severe,	and	thus	the	
more	‘systemic’,	the	breaches	of	liberal	democratic	values	are.	From	this	perspective,	Article	
7	TEU	is	too	blunt	as	an	instrument.	The	sanctions	it	entails	are	potentially	very	far-reaching	
(as	reflected	in	the	notion	of	Article	7	as	a	‘nuclear	option’)	and	what	makes	member	states	
reluctant	to	establish	a	breach	in	Article	7(2)	in	the	first	place	might	be	precisely	the	open-
ended	 nature	 of	 sanctions	 that	 could	 then	 be	 adopted	 under	 Article	 7(3)	with	 a	 qualified	
majority.	Any	attempt	to	give	Article	7	TEU	some	more	bite,	therefore,	would	need	to	make	
it	possible	to	use	it	more	narrowly,	to	vote	on	clearly	defined	sanctions	for	specific	illiberal	
practices	 (even	with	a	higher	majority	 requirement).	 It	 is	unlikely	 that	 target	governments	
completely	abandon	an	 illiberal	governance	system	that	guarantees	 their	hold	on	power	–	
even	if	they	were	credibly	threatened	with	far-reaching	sanctions.	But	they	might	be	more	
inclined	to	acquiesce	to	changing	specific	aspects	of	their	illiberal	system	of	governance	(say,	
control	over	the	media)	for	which	they	are	threatened	with	specific	sanctions	(such	as	a	loss	
of	funding)	if	 it	does	not	mean	giving	up	all	of	their	(illiberal)	levers	of	power.	Such	a	more	
selective	and	piece-meal	use	of	Article	7	might	not	be	ideal	in	view	of	the	systemic	defects	of	
a	 ‘Frankenstate’	 (Scheppele	 2013),	 but	 given	 the	 EU’s	 experience	 with	 accession	
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conditionality,	 it	would	be	a	pragmatic	step	towards	using	the	EU’s	material	 leverage	more	
effectively	against	democratic	backsliding.	
SOCIAL	PRESSURE:	POLITICAL	SAFEGUARDS	BEYOND	ARTICLE	7	TEU	
In	view	of	the	constraints	on	using	the	material	sanctions	of	Article	7	effectively,	we	need	to	
devote	greater	attention	to	alternative	political	safeguards	that	rely	on	persuasion	(Checkel	
2001,	 Risse	 2000)	 and	 social	 pressure	 (Johnston	 2001).	 A	 longstanding	 instrument	 are	
resolutions	and	own	 initiative	 reports	by	 the	EP.	By	exposing	and	criticising	member	 state	
practices	that	breach	 liberal	democratic	principles,	the	main	mechanism	is	shaming.	 In	this	
section,	 I	 will	 focus	 on	 new	 instruments	 that	 EU	 institutions	 have	 developed	 to	 address	
democratic	 backsliding	 in	member	 states.	 The	 emphasis	 on	 dialogue	 in	 the	 Commission’s	
‘rule	of	law	framework’	marks	it	as	an	instrument	based	on	persuasion,	but	the	publicity	of	
the	 process	 also	 entails	 a	 strong	 element	 of	 social	 pressure.	 The	 Council’s	 ‘rule	 of	 law	
dialogue’	 emphasises	 arguing	 and	 persuasion	 over	 the	 possibility	 of	 shaming	 individual	
member	states.	
To	 scrutinise	 the	 capacity	 of	 these	 new	 instruments	 to	 redress	 democratic	
backsliding,	this	section	first	establishes	more	clearly	under	what	conditions	social	pressure	
is	 most	 likely	 to	 be	 successful.	 To	 identify	 these	 conditions,	 I	 draw	 on	 the	 EU’s	 previous	
experience	 in	 using	 social	 pressure,	 and	 on	 the	 broader	 literature	 on	 international	
socialisation	 and	 the	 domestic	 impact	 of	 international	 institutions.	 I	 then	 discuss	 the	
implications	of	 these	 findings	 for	 the	EU’s	new	 instruments	 relying	on	social	pressure,	and	
how	EU	institutions	need	to	apply	them	to	increase	the	likelihood	of	success.	
The	scope	of	social	pressure	
The	experience	of	EU	institutions	in	dealing	with	the	Romanian	government	in	2012	suggests	
that	 it	 is	 indeed	 possible	 to	 exert	 influence	 without	 material	 leverage.	 The	 Romanian	
government,	led	by	Victor	Ponta’s	Social	Democratic	Party	(SDL)	committed	various	breaches	
of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 attempting	 to	 impeach	 their	 party-political	 rival,	 the	 centre-right	
president	 Traian	 Basescu.	 EU	 institutions	 responded	 fairly	 quickly.	 Commission	 President	
Barroso	and	Council	President	Van	Rompuy	each	held	a	meeting	with	Ponta	and	obtained	his	
commitment	to	comply	with	a	list	of	eleven	measures	to	restore	the	rule	of	law.	The	EU	was	
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therefore	 largely	 successful	 in	 pressing	 the	 government	 to	 reverse	 its	measures	 (see	 also	
Isumen	2015;	Pop-Eleches	2013).	
The	 EU’s	 influence	 on	 the	 Ponta	 government	 relied	 heavily	 on	 social	 pressure,	 for	
which	 the	 circumstances	 were	 highly	 favourable	 (Sedelmeier	 2014:	 114-118).	 First,	 social	
pressure	took	place	both	in	the	context	of	acceptable	compliance	costs	and	in	the	shadow	of	
material	pressure.	It	was	not	prohibitively	costly	for	Ponta’s	government	to	comply	with	the	
EU’s	demands.	The	breaches	of	the	rule	of	law	that	the	government	committed	to	impeach	a	
deeply	unpopular	president	bound	to	lose	the	presidential	election	scheduled	for	2014	were	
an	act	of	political	expediency	rather	than	essential	to	hold	on	to	power.	In	addition,	material	
leverage	 was	 not	 completely	 absent.	 In	 contrast	 to	 the	 Hungarian	 case	 in	 which	 the	 EPP	
clearly	stated	 its	defence	of	 the	Fidesz	government,	 the	potential	 threat	of	Article	7	might	
have	found	much	less	opposition	in	the	case	of	the	Romanian	government.	Second,	domestic	
conditions	 for	 social	 influence	 (Checkel	 2001;	 Johnston	 2001;	 Schimmelfennig	 and	
Sedelmeier	 2005a:18-20)	 were	 particularly	 conducive	 in	 Romania.	 The	 EU	 enjoys	 a	 high	
legitimacy	both	with	the	broader	public	and	the	main	political	parties,	including	Ponta’s	SDL.	
This	 strong	 legitimacy	 made	 the	 Romanian	 government	 more	 susceptible	 to	 shaming	
through	 the	 EU’s	 interventions	 (not	 least	 since	 the	 then	 39-year	 old	 Ponta	was	 a	 relative	
novice	to	international	diplomacy,	which	may	have	made	him	more	open	to	persuasion).		
The	 Romanian	 case	 thus	 demonstrates	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 the	 EU	 to	 induce	
member	 state	 governments	 to	 reverse	breaches	of	 liberal	 democracy	without	 threatening	
material	 sanctions.	 Admittedly,	 the	 conditions	 in	 this	 particular	 case	 were	 exceptionally	
conducive	 to	 social	 influence.	 But	 it	 certainly	 cautions	 against	 dismissing	 toothless	
mechanisms	 of	 social	 influence	 and	 persuasion	 too	 quickly	 as	 inevitably	 ineffective.	
Moreover,	 the	 Romanian	 case	 demonstrates	 that	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 pessimistic	 view	 of	
Schlipphak	 and	 Treib	 (2016)	 interventions	 by	 existing	 EU	 institutions	may	 be	 perceived	 as	
legitimate	and	do	not	necessarily	create	a	domestic	backslash.	Crucially,	this	 is	much	more	
likely	if	EU	interventions	entail	social	pressure	rather	than	material	sanctions.		
To	 increase	 the	 likelihood	 of	 success	 of	 social	 pressure,	 we	 can	 derive	 from	 the	
literature	–	in	addition	to	domestic	conditions	mentioned	above	–	also	certain	principles	for	
how	 it	 should	 be	 applied.	 In	 brief,	 the	 influence	 of	 international	 demands	 and	 criticism	
depends	 on	 their	 legitimacy,	 which	 in	 turn	 is	 determined	 by	 specific	 conditions	 (Checkel	
2001;	 Frank	 1990;	 Johnston	 2001;	 Schimmelfenning	 and	 Sedelmeier	 2005a:18-20).	 These	
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conditions	include	that	social	influence	has	to	be	applied	consistently	as	well	as	impartially;	
moreover,	 social	pressure	 requires	publicity	and	 transparency	while	a	depoliticised	 setting	
and	 a	 deliberative	 quality	 of	 interactions	 with	 the	 target	 government	 are	 necessary	 for	
persuasion.	 The	 following	 sub-sections	 assess	 to	 what	 extent	 the	 instruments	 that	 the	
Commission	 and	 the	 Council	 developed	 to	 address	 backsliding	meet	 these	 standards,	 and	
how	they	need	to	be	adjusted	to	enhance	their	effectiveness.		
The	Commission’s	Rule	of	Law	Framework		
In	March	2014,	the	Commission	presented	a	new	framework	that	it	had	adopted	in	order	to	
confront	systematic	 threats	 to	 liberal	democracy	 in	 the	member	states	 (Commission	2014;	
see	 also	 Kochenov	 and	 Pech	 2015).	 This	 framework	 creates	 a	 more	 formal	 procedure	
through	 which	 the	 Commission	 enters	 into	 a	 dialogue	 with	 a	 member	 state	 in	 order	 to	
resolve	the	situation.	It	involves	up	to	three	stages,	if	the	problem	is	not	solved	at	an	earlier	
stage.	In	a	first	step,	the	Commission	assesses	whether	there	is	a	‘systemic	threat’	to	the	rule	
of	law	in	a	member	state.	If	it	finds	that	this	is	the	case,	it	specifies	its	concerns	in	a	‘rule	of	
law	opinion’	to	which	the	member	state	can	respond.	The	second	stage	consists	of	a	‘rule	of	
law	recommendation’	in	which	the	Commission	proposes	concrete	measures	to	address	the	
problems	 and	 specifies	 a	 deadline	 for	 the	member	 state	 to	 do	 so.	 In	 the	 third	 stage,	 the	
Commission	monitors	the	member	state’s	implementation	of	its	recommendation,	and	if	it	is	
not	satisfied,	it	can	propose	using	Article	7.	
The	 process	 thus	 primarily	 establishes	 a	 more	 formal	 and	 structured	 dialogue	
between	 the	 Commission	 and	 the	 member	 state	 concerned	 in	 order	 to	 solve	 the	 issue	
without	 recourse	 to	Article	 7.	 But	 since	 the	Commission	 can	ultimately	 still	 only	 resort	 to	
proposing	the	use	of	Article	7	 if	the	process	fails,	 it	considers	the	rule	of	 law	mechanism	a	
‘pre-Article	 7’	 procedure.	 It	 therefore	 also	 insists	 that	 the	new	process	 does	not	 establish	
new	powers	for	the	Commission	and	that	it	is	complementary	to	existing	procedures.	In	fact,	
to	a	certain	extent	 the	procedure	codifies	earlier	 informal	practice	of	 the	Commission	and	
sets	 it	within	a	more	structured	framework.	As	discussed	above,	 in	the	case	of	Romania	 in	
2012,	Commission	President	Barroso	presented	Prime	Minister	Ponta	with	a	list	of	11	points	
to	 be	 addressed	 in	 order	 to	 solve	 the	 constitutional	 crisis,	 which	 is	 reminiscent	 of	 the	
suggested	 ‘rule	 of	 law	 recommendation’.	 Moreover,	 the	 different	 stages	 in	 the	 process	
resemble	 the	 infringement	procedures	 for	breaches	of	 EU	 law	under	Articles	258	and	260	
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TFEU	and	its	three	stages	(a	letter	of	formal	notice,	a	‘reasoned	opinion’	and	a	referral	to	the	
CJEU).	The	Commission	activated	the	new	framework	for	the	first	time	in	January	2016	after	
the	 PiS	 government	 in	 Poland	 had	 taken	 measures	 to	 limit	 the	 independence	 of	 the	
constitutional	court	and	of	the	media.	After	a	number	of	contacts	did	not	 lead	to	concrete	
steps	to	address	the	concerns	raised	by	the	Commission,	it	 issued	a	‘rule	of	law	opinion’	in	
June	2016.	
In	view	of	 the	conditions	 for	effective	social	pressure,	 the	 rule	of	 law	 framework	 is	
certainly	a	promising	innovation.	First,	a	more	formal	and	structured	procedure	should	enjoy	
greater	 legitimacy	 than	 informal	 practice.	 Second,	 the	 framework	 generates	 the	
transparency	and	publicity	 that	 is	necessary	 for	 the	use	of	social	pressure	and	 it	 is	 flexible	
enough	to	allow	for	more	or	less	public	politicisation,	depending	on	domestic	conditions	in	
the	target	country.	When	targeting	governments	and	elites	that	generally	identify	positively	
with	the	EU	(as	in	the	Romanian	case),	 less	politicisation	and	more	confidential	discussions	
are	 required,	 since	 they	 are	more	 conducive	 to	 persuasion	 and	 allow	 the	 government	 to	
back	down	without	losing	face	domestically.	When	the	target	government	is	Eurosceptic	(as	
in	 the	case	of	Fidesz	or	PiS),	but	 the	EU	enjoys	significant	support	among	the	public	 (as	 in	
Poland),	 greater	 publicity	 and	 a	 more	 transparent	 process	 that	 explicitly	 specifies	 the	
concerns	 of	 EU	 institutions	 is	 more	 promising	 as	 it	 provides	 additional	 legitimacy	 to	 the	
arguments	 of	 the	 domestic	 opposition.	 Third,	 since	 the	 Commission	 is	 an	 independent,	
supranational	 institution,	 the	 framework	 also	 meets	 the	 criterion	 of	 impartiality.	 The	
legitimacy	of	the	process	therefore	might	not	even	require	creating	a	new	body	for	this	task	
or	 outsourcing	 it	 to	 external	 bodies,	 especially	 if	 the	 Commission’s	 assessment	 draws	
transparently	 on	 external	 sources,	 such	 as	 Opinions	 of	 the	 Council	 of	 Europe’s	 Venice	
Commission	or	of	independent	legal	expert	bodies.	To	avoid	accusations	of	partisanship,	the	
Commissioner	 of	 the	 country	 in	 question	 could	 abstain	 from	 votes	 in	 the	 college.	 Donald	
Tusk’s	 criticism	of	using	 the	 framework	against	Poland	 (Financial	Times,	 18.01.2016)	 could	
be	 interpreted	precisely	as	an	attempt	 to	avoid	accusations	of	 instrumentalising	 the	EU	to	
discredit	domestic	party	political	rivals.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 changes	 in	 application	 of	 the	 framework	 are	 necessary.	 The	
Commission	might	find	it	politically	expedient	to	fudge	or	dodge	cases	that	it	fears	it	cannot	
win	 (Batory	 2016),	 but	 this	 undermines	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 EU’s	 interventions.	
Argumentative	 consistency	 requires	 the	 Commission	 to	 go	 after	 all	 cases	 equally.	 In	 this	
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sense,	 using	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law	mechanism	 against	 Poland	 but	 not	Hungary	 undermines	 the	
legitimacy	of	the	process,	even	if	 it	were	strategically	expedient	given	the	low	likelihood	of	
success	in	the	latter	case.	By	the	same	token,	even	if	it	proves	impossible	to	trigger	Article	7	
against	an	unresponsive	government,	it	is	important	to	keep	cases	open	and	on	the	agenda	
to	sustain	social	pressure	as	a	resource	for	domestic	actors	working	to	expose	and	overturn	
illiberal	government	practices.	
The	EU	Justice	Scoreboard	
Independently	 of	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law	 Framework,	 the	 Commission	 also	 developed	 a	 tool	 to	
monitor	the	effectiveness	of	national	justice	systems,	the	‘EU	Justice	Scoreboard’,	published	
annually	 since	 March	 2013.	 The	 Scoreboard	 presents	 data	 on	 the	 efficiency	 of	 national	
courts	 according	 to	 specific	 comparative	 indicators	 (such	 as	 the	 length	 of	 judicial	
proceedings,	 the	 clearance	 rate,	 and	 number	 of	 pending	 cases),	 rather	 than	 an	 overall	
ranking	of	member	states.	The	Scoreboard’s	data	on	perceptions	of	 judicial	 independence,	
arguably	the	most	salient	issue	for	systemic	rule	of	law	crises	among	the	data	it	covers,	focus	
narrowly	on	perceptions	of	business	end-users	and	are	only	a	minor	(albeit	growing)	part	of	
the	 Scoreboard’s	 assessments.	 This	 narrow	 focus	 fits	 the	 Commission’s	 rationale	 for	 the	
Scoreboard:	 highlighting	 the	 importance	 of	 functioning	 national	 justice	 systems	 for	
economic	growth	and	the	operation	of	 the	Single	Market	 (Commission	2013:	1-2).	But	 the	
Scoreboard	 is	 therefore	more	 suitable	 as	 an	 instrument	 to	 guide	 reforms	 to	 improve	 the	
efficiency	 of	 national	 justice	 systems,	 rather	 than	 for	 assessing	 their	 role	 in	 guaranteeing	
checks	and	balances	and	thus	as	a	tool	to	identify	threats	to	liberal	democracy.		
The	 Scoreboard	 in	 its	 current	 form	 is	 therefore	 a	 missed	 opportunity	 for	 a	 more	
effective	 exercise	 of	 social	 pressure.	 Yet	 if	 its	 scope	 was	 broadened,	 it	 could	 play	 an	
important	role	in	embedding	the	rule	of	 law	mechanism	in	a	process	of	regular	monitoring	
across	the	member	states.	Along	these	lines,	the	EP	has	called	on	the	Commission	‘to	cover	
the	periodic	state-by-state	assessment	of	compliance	with	fundamental	rights	and	the	rule	
of	law’	(European	Parliament	2015:16)	and	Kochenov	and	Pech	(2015:	537)	have	suggested	it	
might	 also	 be	 used	 for	 a	 ‘rule	 of	 law	 ranking’	 of	 EU	 countries.	 Regular	 monitoring	 of	 all	
member	states	would	 increase	the	 legitimacy	of	social	pressure	by	avoiding	accusations	of	
focusing	 selectively	 on	 individual	 member	 states.	 It	 would	 also	 allow	 the	 Commission	 to	
comment	 regularly	 on	measures	 that	 are	 problematic	 –	 even	 if	 the	 situation	 has	 not	 yet	
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reached	 the	 level	 of	 a	 ‘systemic	 breach’	 and	 provide	 domestic	 actors	 with	 ideational	
leverage	 to	 fight	 against	 such	 measures.	 Regularly	 commenting	 on	 any	 problematic	
measures	in	all	member	states	would	also	improve	argumentative	consistency	and	pre-empt	
attempts	by	illiberal	governments	to	justify	their	own	measures	with	reference	to	practices	
elsewhere	 that	 had	not	 been	denounced	 equally.	 Finally,	 regular	monitoring	 also	 helps	 to	
operationalise	 the	 principles	 of	 Article	 2	 (see	 also	 Blauberger	 and	 Kelemen	 2016),	 and	
rendering	 them	more	determinate	 increases	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 claims	 that	 they	 have	been	
breached.	
The	Council’s	Rule	of	Law	Dialogue	
In	 contrast	 to	 the	 potential	 for	 effective	 social	 pressure	 of	 the	 Commission’s	 new	
instruments	 (especially	 if	 adapted	 appropriately),	 the	 Council’s	 new	 instrument	 to	 protect	
the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 the	member	 states	 is	 far	more	 limited.	 In	 December	 2014,	 the	 Council	
agreed	to	establish	an	annual	‘dialogue	…	to	promote	and	safeguard	the	rule	of	law’	among	
the	member	states	within	the	General	Affairs	Council	(Council	2014:	20-21).	Key	principles	of	
the	 dialogue	 are	 that	 it	 should	 be	 ‘conducted	 on	 a	 non	 partisan	 and	 evidence-based	
approach’	according	to	‘the	principle	of	sincere	cooperation’;	and	that	it	should	‘respect	the	
national	 identities	 of	Member	 States’	 (which	may	 be	 Council-speak	 to	 legitimise	 different	
governments’	interpretation	of	democracy).	Arguably	these	principles	reflect	the	concern	of	
some	member	states	that	the	dialogue	should	not	be	used	to	discuss,	and	potentially	shame,	
specific	 member	 states.	 Instead	 of	 focusing	 on	 countries,	 the	 Council	 ‘will	 consider,	 as	
needed,	to	launch	debates	on	thematic	subject	matters’	(2014:	21).	
The	early	practice	of	the	Council	Dialogue	suggests	an	aversion	to	discussing	precisely	
the	 most	 salient	 challenges	 to	 liberal	 democracy	 among	 its	 members.	 The	 first	 Council	
Dialogue	on	18	November	2015	focused	primarily	on	the	balance	between	counter-terrorism	
and	 the	protection	of	human	 rights	 (Agence	Europe	 20.11.2015).	Governments	also	 raised	
more	specific	 issues,	such	as	how	to	respond	to,	and	control,	radical	websites,	and	how	to	
prevent	a	race	to	the	bottom	in	the	treatment	of	refugees.	Notwithstanding	the	importance	
of	these	topics,	this	choice	clearly	seems	to	reflect	an	agreement	among	the	member	states	
to	 steer	 clear	 of	 discussing	 e.g.	 the	 political	 situation	 in	 Hungary,	 or	 more	 generally	 the	
broader	 issues	 that	 it	 raises	 with	 regard	 to	 protecting	 liberal	 democracy,	 such	 as	 the	
concentration	of	power	by	national	governments.	The	focus	of	discussion	seems	to	support	
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the	 view	 that	 the	 Dialogue	 was	 either	 primarily	 created	 as	 an	 attempt	 to	 ‘kill	 off’	 the	
Commission’s	rule	of	 law	framework	and	to	pre-empt	 its	activation,	or	that	 it	presents	the	
lowest	 common-denominator	 compromise	 acceptable	 to	 the	 Hungarian	 government	
(Kochenov	and	Pech	2015:	534;	536).		
The	 Council	 Dialogue	might	 still	 play	 a	 useful	 role	 in	 codifying	 principles	 and	 best	
practice	pertaining	to	certain	aspects	of	liberal	democracy	in	the	member	states	before	they	
become	contested.	But	it	does	not	seem	to	provide	a	forum	conducive	to	either	persuasion	
or	social	pressure	once	problems	emerge.	
CONCLUSIONS	
This	 contribution	 has	 suggested	 that	 since	 the	 political	 feasibility	 of	 treaty	 changes	 to	
judicialise	the	EU’s	tools	against	democratic	backsliding	is	 limited	(Blauberger	and	Kelemen	
2016),	 the	 EU	will	 have	 to	 rely	 on	 political	 safeguards,	 such	 as	 Article	 7	 TEU	 and	modest	
institutional	 innovations	 like	 the	 Commission’s	 ‘rule	 of	 law	 mechanism’.	 Moreover,	 the	
effectiveness	of	 the	material	 sanctions	 is	 limited,	partly	because	 it	 is	extremely	difficult	 to	
use	 Article	 7	 TEU,	 partly	 because	 even	 a	 credible	 threat	 of	 severe	 material	 sanctions	 is	
unlikely	to	bring	illiberal	governments	to	renounce	the	very	practices	on	which	they	rely	to	
maintain	 office.	 A	 change	 to	Article	 7	 to	make	 a	more	 selective	 use	with	 clearly	 specified	
sanctions	possible	–	even	with	a	higher	voting	threshold	–	could	make	material	sanctions	a	
more	 effective	 threat.	 Yet	 short	 of	 such	 treaty	 changes,	 EU	 institutions	 will	 have	 to	 rely	
primarily	on	political	safeguards	based	on	dialogue,	persuasion,	and	shaming	rather	than	on	
material	sanctions	to	influence	illiberal	governments.	
Social	pressure	is	not	inevitably	ineffective	in	countering	democratic	backsliding.	The	
case	 of	 Romania	 in	 2012	 demonstrates	 that	 under	 certain	 –	 admittedly	 demanding	 –	
conditions	in	a	target	country,	social	pressure	can	lead	the	government	to	redress	breaches	
of	 liberal	 democratic	 principles.	 These	 conditions	 are	manifestly	 absent	 in	 the	 case	of	 the	
Fidesz	government	 in	Hungary	and	arguably	–	albeit	 less	unfavourable	–	 in	the	case	of	the	
PiS	government	in	Poland.	Yet	even	in	cases	where	the	conditions	are	unconducive	to	social	
influence,	it	does	not	mean	that	the	EU	can	do,	and	should	do,	nothing.		
Instead,	more	attention	should	be	devoted	to	applying	the	instruments	that	rely	on	
social	 influence	more	 effectively.	 The	 Council	 Dialogue	 is	 too	 averse	 to	 discussing	 specific	
member	 states	 to	 provide	 a	 forum	 for	 tackling	 backsliding	 through	 persuasion	 or	 social	
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pressure.	 Yet	 it	might	play	 an	 (albeit	more	 limited)	 role	 in	 establishing	 a	 consensus	 about	
good	practice	on	key	 issues	before	they	become	contested.	The	Commission’s	Rule	of	Law	
Framework	 meets	 key	 criteria	 for	 effective	 social	 pressure,	 such	 as	 a	 formal	 process,	
impartiality	 and	 publicity,	 but	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 applied	 more	 consistently	 to	 enhance	 its	
legitimacy	 on	 which	 it	 relies	 for	 its	 influence.	 The	 Commission’s	 Justice	 Scoreboard	 in	 its	
current	form	is	too	narrowly	focused	on	the	efficiency	of	national	court	systems.	A	broader	
scope	 would	 enable	 it	 to	 embed	 the	 Rule	 of	 Law	 Framework	 in	 a	 process	 of	 continuous	
monitoring	of	compliance	with	liberal	democratic	principles	across	the	member	states.	
In	sum,	even	if	EU	institutions	essentially	have	to	rely	on	soft	political	instruments	to	
confront	democratic	backsliding	in	member	states,	they	are	not	powerless.	But	they	have	to	
be	mindful	to	apply	and	to	adjust	them	in	such	a	way	as	to	maximise	their	effectiveness.		
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